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THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: SHORING
UP OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM
David L. Markellt
"I'm mad as hell and I'm not going to take it anymore."'
INTRODUCrION
A little more than three years ago, on May 13, 1991, the City
of Columbus, Ohio issued a report entitled Environmental Legisla-
tion: The Increasing Costs of Regulatory Compliance to the City of
Columbus.2 The New York Times characterized this report as "the
first major study to identify the cost of complying with Federal en-
vironmental regulations. '3 According to the Times' article, the re-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School; J.D. 1979, University of Vir-
ginia; B.A. 1975, Brandeis University. Prior to joining the Law School's faculty in
1992, Professor Markell worked both in state government (as Director of the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation's Division of Environmental
Enforcement) and in the federal government (with the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and the U.S. Department of Justice's Environmental Enforcement
Section).
I would like to thank Amy Petragnani for her research assistance in connection
with this article.
1. "Network," directed by Sidney Lumet, screenplay by Paddy Chayefsky.
See,e.g., Rick Kogan, Humiliated in Hawaii, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 1991, at C7.
2. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE, ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION:
THE INCREASING COSTS OF REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TO THE CITY OF COLUMBUS,
REPORT OF THE LAW REviEw COMMITTEE TO THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
THE CITY OF COLUMBUS (May 13, 1991) [hereinafter COLUMBUS STUDY].
3. Keith Schneider, How a Rebellion Over Environmental Rules Grew From a
Patch of Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A16 [hereinafter Patch of Weeds]. A
subsequent study of environmental mandates that the City of Anchorage, Alaska con-
ducted termed the Columbus Study "a national milestone." MUNICIPALITY OF
ANCHORAGE, ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, PAYING FOR FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL MAN-
DATES: A LOOMING CRISIS FOR CITIES AND COUNTIES, at 17 (Sept. 1992) [hereinafter
ANCHORAGE REPORT].
A July 1993, report from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions ("ACIR") advises that "[t]he federal government [itself] has little systematic
data concerning the cumulative financial costs of the regulations it imposes on state
and local governments." U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RE-
LATIONS, FEDERAL REGULATION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: THE MIXED
RECORD OF THE 1980S (A-126), at iii (July 1993) [hereinafter ACIR REPORT]. ACIR
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port "showed that environmental costs were about to swamp
Columbus in red ink-or generate a revolt."'4 The Columbus Study
itself summarized the significant investment of local funds required
to comply with federal and state environmental laws as follows:
Over the past few years ... [t]he number of environmental
mandates has increased substantially to the point where an aver-
age of 22 different federal and state mandates have been imple-
mented in each of the last three years. The funding available
from federal and state government bodies to assist with compli-
ance with the new mandates has been decreasing at an alarming
rate, while the share of costs to local governments has been in-
creasing at a dramatic rate.5
makes the point regarding the paucity of data more emphatically later in the report:
"Remarkably little data are available on the cumulative costs of federal mandates,
despite the significance of the issue for state and local government officials." Id. at 59.
ACIR notes that the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") develops estimates of the
intergovernmental fiscal effects of proposed federal legislation, but it notes that these
estimates "are approximate and generally conservative due to the inherent difficulties
in estimating mandates and to flaws in the statute." Id.
The United States ACIR "was created by Congress in 1959 to monitor the opera-
tion of the American federal system and to recommend improvements. ACIR is an
independent, bipartisan commission composed of 26 members-nine representing the
federal government, 14 representing state and local government, and three represent-
ing the general public." ACIR REPORT, at back cover.
4. Patch of Weeds, supra note 3, at A16; see also Philip H. Albertson, Regulatory
Costs, 259 SCIENCE 159, 159 (Jan. 8, 1993). This last article refers to the COLUMBUS
STUDY, remarking that
[o]n 20 January, the Democrats become sole heirs to a phenomenon of regu-
lation gone amok. In April 1992, 59 regulatory agencies with about 125,000
employees were at work on 4,186 pending regulations. The cost during 1991
of mandates already in place has been estimated at $542 billion. The fastest
growing component of costs is environmental regulations, which amounted
to $115 billion in 1991 but are slated to grow by more than 50 percent in
constant dollars by the year 2000.
Twenty years ago, costs of federal environmental regulations were not
visible to the public. However, the number and stringency of unfunded fed-
eral requirements have since increased markedly. New and tighter regula-
tions have drained funds from cities, towns, school districts, and individuals.
A result is the beginning of a revolt. There is a growing questioning of the
factual basis for federal command and control actions and of the scientific
competence of the regulators.
Albertson, supra note 4, at 159.
5. COLUMBUS STUDY, supra note 2, at Abstract. The Study notes that
[slome perspective on the magnitude of these costs can be gained by realiz-
ing that the entire City budget for 1991 is $591 million. Identified environ-
mental compliance costs in 1991 are $62 million or about 11% of the total
budget.... It is expected that the City will increase its expenditures on
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Several other cities throughout the country have emulated Co-
lumbus' pioneering effort to evaluate the impact of federal and
state environmental mandates and have similarly concluded that
the simultaneous increase in costs imposed by these mandates and
reduction in funding support threatens to "swamp" local
government. 6
environmental compliance from near the $62 million level in 1991 to some
$107 million in 1995.
Id. at 3. While this article focuses primarily on EPA-imposed environmental man-
dates, other federal agencies promulgate environmental mandates as well, including
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"), the Army Corp
of Engineers, the Department of Interior, and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA"). See, e.g., COLUMBUS STUDY, supra note 2, at 6. The Co-
lumbus Study's reference to environmental mandates is not limited to EPA-imposed
obligations.
One issue concerning the Columbus numbers is that, as ACIR notes in its report,
only incremental costs are properly attributed to federal mandates; that is, only the
portion of a mandated activity that is attributable to federal prescription rather than
state or local option is counted. If a jurisdiction is engaged in a mandated activity
prior to the federal requirement, for example, the costs should not be attributed to
the mandate unless the jurisdiction would have chosen to stop providing the service
without the federal prescription. The costs of a mandated activity also should not be
included in this estimate if a jurisdiction would have provided the service regardless of
the federal requirement. ACIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 59.
Andrew Spielman of the EPA's Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation
("OPPE") made the same point, using the example of a city providing the water sup-
ply for its residents:
The city is going to incur certain costs for the provision of a basic ser-
vice, e.g., pumping and transporting drinking water. These costs may be in-
dependent of the costs associated with mandates to treat the water under
federal environmental law. Consequently, it is not appropriate to include
the former costs in calculating the cost to implement federal environmental
mandates.
Telephone conversation with Mr. Andrew Spielman (Sept. 9, 1993).
Nevertheless, in its recent report on the impact of federal environmental man-
dates on local governments, the EPA appears to agree that both the number and cost
of its mandates have increased significantly, and that these significant increases make
implementation of the mandates "problematic," noting as follows:
Increasingly.... the [drinking water supply, wastewater and solid waste col-
lection and disposal] services [that local governments provide] are subject to
larger numbers of complex federal environmental regulations.... Comply-
ing with these federal regulations has required a level of service that has
stretched the capacity and the resources of these local public works depart-
ments and in many cases made implementation very problematic.
U.S.E.P.A., LOCAL GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MAN-
DATES, FIVE CASE STUDIES, FINAL REPORT, at 15 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter EPA
REPORT].
6. See, e.g., ANCHORAGE REPORT, supra note 3; U.S.E.P.A., TESTIMONY ON THE
REVIEW OF EXISTING REGULATIONS, "THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACr," CITY
Syracuse Law Review
The confluence of increasing federal mandates and decreasing
funding from the federal government has proven frustrating to lo-
cal governmental officials. The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") summarizes the message it received from one of the five
cities it studied: "We are going to see a revolution by local govern-
ments. They will say, 'EPA, if you want it done then do it your-
OF LEWISTON, MAINE (May 15, 1992) [hereinafter MAINE REPORT]; PUTTING FEDER-
ALISM TO WORK FOR AMERICA, TACKLING THE PROBLEMS OF UNFUNDED MAN-
DATES AND BURDENSOME REGULATIONS, CITY OF CHICAGO (Nov. 19, 1992)
[hereinafter CHICAGO REPORT].
The dramatic increase during the past few years in federal mandates did not oc-
cur on a blank slate. In the 1960s and 1970s, "[flederal regulation in many fields
began gradually and grew incrementally." ACIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 9. Citizens
began to doubt the ability of the states to deal effectively with environmental dilem-
mas, and "a more active federal role was deemed necessary to deal effectively with
problems that spilled across state and local borders." Id.
As the number and rigor of federal mandates increased, however, states began to
question the whole scheme of federal regulation. As the ACIR Report notes, "[b]y
the early 1980s, the Congress had enacted a series of statutes designed to restrain the
growth of federal intergovernmental regulation . .. " Id. at 10. Additionally, the
executive and judicial branches took steps to decentralize regulation. Id
These efforts did not free state and local governments from federal obligations.
Instead, "Congress began passing the buck to the states by greatly reducing revenue
sharing, at the same time keeping the programs it formerly funded, and adding even
more costly new programs." ANCHORAGE REPORT, supra note 3, at 24, 27.
A recent report issued by the City of Chicago briefly summarizes this portion of
the history behind the trend of increasing mandates accompanied by decreasing
funding:
In the early 1980's, the Reagan administration proposed a set of reforms
generically know [sic] as the "New Federalism." The Reagan proposals
called for severely reducing the federal role, deregulation, and a general re-
duction in governmental activism. Although much of the Reagan agenda
was never carried out, a general reduction in federal aid to state and local
governments was a clear result of the policies of the 1980s. Federal funding
was cut, but mandated requirements on states and localities were not. Ac-
cording to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, fed-
eral grants constituted 26.5 percent of state and local outlays in 1978 but fell
to 18 percent in 1988....
Reagan's "New Federalism" proposals, to the extent they were put into
effect, were widely criticized as being more illusion than reality. Instead of
creating more flexibility for state and local governments, "New Federalism"
turned out to be a tale of broken promises: Funding for various programs
was cut while the promised revenue "turnbacks" and local flexibility never
occurred. "New Federalism" was legitimately blamed for provoking a
budget crisis for states and localities. As one observer stated, the "New Fed-
eralism" approach to government created "the worst of both worlds: Fed-
eral controls and red tape, with a diminishing federal pocketbook."
CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 6, at 8-9.
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self.' "7 A resolution that Dekalb County, Georgia adopted on
August 10, 1993, articulates this frustration, terming "unfunded
federal mandates" a "breach [of] the underlying principles of fed-
eralism which assumes a working partnership and shared responsi-
bilities between [sic] federal, state and local governments." 8
According to one commentator,9 while the issue of unfunded
governmental mandates imposed on local governments has been
important since the 1960s, it is now "the number one intergovern-
mental issue in the United States due to the cumulative impact of
state and federal mandates."'1 According to the New York Times,
7. EPA REPORT, supra note 5, at B32.
8. DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA, RESOLUTION (Aug. 10, 1993) [hereinafter
DEKALB RESOLUTION]. The International City/County Management Association
("ICMA") Environmental Mandates Task Force recently drafted a similar Sample
Resolution on Unfunded Mandates. ICMA, SAMPLE RESOLUTION ON UNFUNDED
MANDATES (1993).
9. Dr. Bruce McDowell of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations.
10. INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION (ICMA), ENVI-
RONMENTAL MANDATES TASK FORCE MEETING, MEETING NOTES, at 1 (Mar. 5, 1993)
[hereinafter MEETING NOTES]. See also, Shelley Emling, Mandates Drying Up County
Funds Enough, THE ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Aug. 24, 1993, at B1 ("Gripes about
unfunded mandates are not new, but they're growing louder as the demands grow
more costly.").
This recent wave of complaints and organized opposition at the local level to
federal mandates has not occurred on a clean slate. In the 1970s and early 1980s,
Congress and Presidents Carter and Reagan took a series of actions that were
designed to address this issue. As ACIR notes in its recent report, "[b]y 1981, mount-
ing concern over the 'mandate problem' had produced a surge of regulatory relief and
reform efforts on the part of all three branches of the federal government to address
the problems posed by regulation." ACIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. Among the
actions that Congress took were its enactment of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1980), the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-G12
(1980), and the State and Local Government Cost Estimate Act, 2 U.S.C. § 653
(1981).
In terms of activity in the Executive Branch, President Reagan established a
"Task Force on Regulatory Relief" early in his first term, and he issued three execu-
tive orders designed to (1) institutionalize presidential control over the regulatory
process (Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985)), (2) restrain the issuance
of costly mandates (Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981)), and (3) re-
quire that agencies consider the federalism implications of their regulatory actions
(Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41685-41688 (1987)). Id. at 1.
Despite these efforts, however, the "federal government's overall regulatory bur-
den on states and localities continued to rise during the 1980s." ACIR REPORT, supra
note 3, at 1, 2.
Despite concerted presidential action to control federal rulemaking activity,
the burdens imposed on state and local governments by administrative rules
and regulations continued to increase during the 1980s .... Between 1981
1993] 889
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the Columbus study's findings have prompted various groups rep-
resenting local governments to make it a priority to revisit the na-
tion's environmental laws to address the mounting costs they
impose.1
In recent months, national leaders of both political parties
have seemingly recognized the potential force of this incipient re-
bellion against federal environmental regulation. For example,
they too have inveighed against the federal government's enact-
ment of "unfunded environmental mandates"-i.e., mandates that
the federal government imposes on local governments without en-
acting corresponding appropriations to help local governments pay
for the activities needed to fulfill these requirements. In a recent
speech, President Clinton said that "he hoped the 're-inventing
government' study led by Vice President Gore would result in a
're-affirmation of the idea that the federal government should not
and 1990, the Congress enacted 27 statutes that imposed new regulatory bur-
dens on states and localities or significantly expanded existing programs.
This record of regulatory expansion was comparable to, and in some respects
surpassed, the unprecedented pace of intergovernmental regulation com-
piled in the 1970s, when 22 such statutes were enacted.
Id.
The ACIR Report provides its analysis of the flaws in these tools. Id. at 4.
Further, the "[m]ore prescriptive regulations added programmatic requirements
and compliance costs." Id. at 24. The ACIR Report describes this situation as "a
continuing increase in intergovernmental regulation during the same time the federal
government mounted the most direct attack ever on federal mandates." Id. And it
contrasts the 1970s and 1980s with earlier decades: "[T]he 1970s and 1980s stand out
from earlier decades in their reliance on regulating state and local governments,
rather than providing financial subsidies to these entities, to influence their actions."
Id. at 55.
11. Patch of Weeds, supra note 3, at A16 (Stating that, "prompted by the Colum-
bus Study, the National League of Cities has made updating the Nation's environmen-
tal laws-and through that reducing costs-one of its top five political priorities in
Washington.").
Frustration with mandates is not limited to the environmental field. On August
30, 1993, the New York Times reported that the town of Meriden, Connecticut voted
to refuse to institute a state-mandated free-breakfast program at one of its elementary
schools, quoting the Mayor as stating, "The feeling I get is [the Board of Education
members are] fed up with all these mandates, and enough is enough .... I think
people have had it." A School Board and State Fight Over Free Breakfast: Blue-Collar
Defiance Risks Court Action, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1993, at B5.
Two other signs that the level of frustration is mounting are (1) the call for a
"National Unfunded Mandates Awareness Day," see DEKALB RESOLUTION, supra
note 8, at 2, and (2) the scheduling of an October 7-9, 1993, conference in Washing-
ton, D.C. on "Re-inventing the Federal Local Partnership to Protect the Environ-
ment" by the National Association of Counties.
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continue to put unfunded liabilities on the states.' "12 Senate Mi-
nority Leader Robert Dole made a similar point at the same meet-
ing, stating as follows:
Mandates sound like a great thing when they come on the Sen-
ate floor in Congress. But I know they are not well received for
good reasons by state legislatures all across America. If we are
going to pass mandates, then we ought to fund the mandate or
we shouldn't do it in the first place. 13
Section I of this article describes the criticisms that local gov-
ernments have made in recent years concerning the increasing bur-
den that federal environmental regulation places on local
government. Section II offers some preliminary thoughts concern-
ing the actions the federal government should consider taking to
address these concerns.
I. THE "ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATE" ISSUE
This section summarizes the concerns that local governments
have raised regarding federal and state environmental mandates.' 4
These criticisms can be divided into four major areas, discussed
12. Peter A. Brown, Federal Mandates Pass the Buck to 50 States, ALBANY TIMES
UNION, Aug. 9, 1993, at A-I, A-10; see also David Broder, Clinton Isn't Forgetting that
States Deserve Federal Mandate Relief, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Aug. 15, 1993, at E-5
("[President] Clinton clearly understands that the partnership of local, state and na-
tional governments is badly frayed and in need of repair.").
13. Id.
14. Much of this section was developed by reviewing the EPA's own very recent
report on environmental mandates, see supra note 5, and by reviewing the major stud-
ies on the issue that cities themselves have conducted, including the Columbus Study,
see supra note 2, the City of Anchorage's report, see supra note 3, and the City of
Lewiston, Maine's report, see supra note 6.
In addition to having the virtue of providing the views of five different cities in a
single report, the EPA REPORT notes that the EPA selected these cities "to ensure a
mix of community characteristics such as size, economic base, geographic location,
and ecological conditions," EPA REPORT, supra note 6, at i, 3, although it continues
that its sample "is in no way intended to be statistically valid or representative." Id. at
3.
In addition to these reports, the American Public Works Association, Southern
California Chapter has prepared a report entitled A STUDY OF NATIONWIDE COSTS
TO IMPLEMENT MUNICIPAL STORMWATER BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (May
1992); the State of Ohio also recently issued a report entitled THE NEED FOR A NEW
FEDERALISM: FEDERAL MANDATES AND THEIR IMPACrs ON THE STATE OF OHIO;
nine cities in Ohio have issued a report entitled OHIO METROPOLITAN AREA COST
REPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE (Sept. 15, 1992); and the City of Chicago
has prepared a report entitled PUTTING FEDERALISM TO WORK FOR AMERICA, TACK-
Syracuse Law Review
below. 15
A. The "Unfunded Mandates" Complaint or the "Putting your
money where your mandates are" criticism.
As suggested above, local governments are complaining that
the number and cost of federal mandates have increased dramati-
cally in recent years, while the federal funding to implement these
mandates has simultaneously diminished. 16 The confluence of
LING THE PROBLEMS OF UNFUNDED MANDATES AND BURDENSOME REGULATIONS
(Nov. 19, 1992).
Mandates are imposed in a multitude of environmental programs addressing a
variety of environmental problems, including water and air pollution, and solid and
hazardous wastes. In its report, the EPA notes that municipalities often are involved
in mandates involving the following environmental programs: (1) wastewater collec-
tion and disposal and the NPDES permit program; (2) industrial discharges and the
NPDES pre-treatment program; (3) stormwater discharge and control and the
NPDES stormwater program; (4) provision of drinking water and the PWSS program;
and (5) collection and disposal of municipal solid waste and the RCRA subtitle D
program. EPA REPORT, supra note 5, at 11, Al-15. The report provides a summary
of these programs and their potential impact on local governments. Id. In addition,
municipalities may face mandates that create significant expense at the local level
under the Superfund and Underground Storage Tank programs. Id. at 14.
In its report, the City of Anchorage notes as follows regarding the specific focus
of environmental mandates:
In the past, water pollution control programs mandated primarily by the
Clean Water and Safe Drinking Water Acts have been responsible for about
half of municipalities' compliance costs, according to the Environmental
Protection Agency.
The agency estimates that another third of compliance costs results from
mandates of the Clean Air Act. The remainder is attributed to a variety of
land pollution programs mandated by [RCRA], [CERCLA] and [TSCA].
Also included in the final category are [EPCRA] and [OSHA].
ANCHORAGE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5 (referencing U.S.E.P.A., ENVIRONMENTAL
INVESTMENTS: THE COST OF A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT (Dec. 1990)).
15. To some extent these categories are artificial. Several of these complaints
overlap with one another. For example, in its report, the EPA at one point combines
the concern relating to increasing numbers of mandates with the critique that these
mandates do not address real risks: "Interviewees object to having to impose higher
rates and taxes on their residents to pay for new environmental mandates. Weak
economic bases and a lack of "buy-in" on the assessment of risk underlying the re-
quirements reinforce this reluctance." EPA REPORT, supra note 5, at ii.
In addition, this list of criticisms is not necessarily all encompassing. For exam-
ple, in its report, the EPA also mentions that local officials complained that "the cur-
rent regulatory approach targets them disproportionately in assigning responsibility
for protecting the environment .... " Id. at ii, 25-26.
16. COLUMBUS STUDY, supra note 2, at 2,7 ("On a national level there has been
a significant change in the policy on funding at the same time as the federal mandates
have been increasing. While the environmental mandates are increasing in frequency
892 [Vol. 44:885
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these trends has exacerbated local governments' difficult financial
situations. As a March, 1993, article entitled Escalating Environ-
mental Mandates: Can Local Governments Cope?, which summa-
rizes the first meeting of ICMA's Environmental Mandates Task
Force on December 8 and 9, 1992, stated: "The cumulative effect of
20 years of environmental legislation threatens to overwhelm many
local governments."' 17
and scope, the funding available from federal and state governmental bodies to com-
ply with the new mandates has been decreasing at an alarming rate.").
According to the Anchorage report, even the EPA anticipates that local govern-
ment costs to comply with environmental mandates will increase by 60% to 120% in
the 1990s. ANCHORAGE REPORT, supra note 3, at 38. The City's own estimate is that
the cumulative cost of federal environmental mandates per household between 1991
and 2000 will increase from $153 in 1991 to $631 in 2000. Id. at 49.
In a report he prepared for the Regulatory Information Service Center, Thomas
D. Hopkins, Gosnell Professor of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, con-
cluded that the evidence regarding the costs that the private sector and state-local
governments bear in complying with federal regulation "remain[s] spotty and riddled
with definitional and accounting inconsistencies." Thomas D. Hopkins, REGULA-
TORY INFORMATION SERVICE CENTER, COSTS OF REGULATION: FILLING THE GAPS,
at 1 (Aug. 1992) [hereinafter FILLING THE GAPS]. Professor Hopkins went on to con-
clude, however, that the annual cost of complying with federal environmental regula-
tions will increase from $42 billion in 1977 (in 1991 dollars) to an anticipated $178
billion in 2000 (in 1991 dollars). Id. at 2. He noted that the federal government's July
1992 Mid-Session Review of the 1993 Fiscal Year Budget lists 25 new regulations from
the EPA that will increase compliance costs by approximately $14 billion. Id. at 5.
And he further observed that "[aIll of these cost estimates are generated by the regu-
latory agencies themselves .... [T]hey are more likely to understate than to overstate
compliance costs." Id. at 7. See also ACIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 24 (Discussing
the impact of all federal programs on state and local governments: "[als requirements
mounted [between 1981 and 1986], the costs of compliance also generally rose, but
federal assistance declined.").
17. Cynthia C. Kelly, Escalating Environmental Mandates: Can Local Govern-
ments Cope?, PUB. MGMT., Mar. 1993, at 2 [hereinafter Environmental Mandates].
The cover letter to the City of Anchorage's report, which is signed by the Mayor
of Anchorage and mayors from cities in forty-nine states, similarly notes that "[i]n the
past seven years, both the number and costs of these [unfunded environmental] man-
dates have mushroomed. Tomorrow their costs may be intolerable." ANCHORAGE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (cover letter).
In the foreword to the report, Mayor Fink of Anchorage describes the emerging
concern with the substance of environmental mandates as follows:
It is difficult to address the subject of environmental mandates without
being depicted by certain groups as "anti-environment." Mayors may disa-
gree with intolerable costs of a rule, with the necessity for regulating when
risks are negligible, with the regulatory process itself, or because the science
is lacking, or a particular mandate lacks flexibility. None of these positions
means they are anti-environment.
To the contrary, many mayors contend the laws and regulations should
be more stringent than they are today. Regardless of where they stand on
Syracuse Law Review
The call to match mandates with funding to implement them
as one solution to this problem appears to have won broad national
support among local government officials. According to the
Anchorage Report, at the June, 1992, Conference of Mayors in
Houston, Texas:
Mayors speaking ... were far more vocal this year than last over
the ever-growing costs of unfunded federally-mandated pro-
grams .... The mayors countered that, if the environment is
such a high national priority, Congress ought to back up its com-
mitment with the necessary funding or, at the very least, help
pay for it. To reinforce that position, a strongly-worded position
statement opposing unfunded federal mandates was adopted at
the Houston conference. 18
And the Anchorage Report indicates that Knoxville, Tennessee
Mayor Victor Ashe, who chaired a workshop on unfunded man-
dates in Houston, made these comments during the session:
Congress does not have the money to fund ... the types of pro-
grams that get members re-elected. As a result, more and more
mandates have been passed with less funding or no funding at
all. It is wrong for Congress to create programs it is unwilling to
fund .... 19
the issue of environmental protection, very few are optimistic that they, and
the populations they serve, will be able to finance an ever-growing list of
unfunded national environmental imperatives.
Id. at iii (emphasis in original).
The ANCHORAGE REPORT ultimately labels unfunded environmental mandates
as a "major contributor to community financial woes . . . ." Id. at 1.
18. Id. at 13.
19. Id. at 14. In its report, the EPA similarly notes that officials from the case
study communities "believed that EPA or the State should pay for all or part of the
costs incurred by local governments in carrying out some EPA requirements." EPA
REPORT, supra note 5, at 23. According to the EPA, these officials "object to having
to impose higher rates and taxes on their residents to pay for new environmental
mandates." Id. at ii, 23-24. Reflecting the overlap between the various categories of
criticisms discussed herein, the EPA report continues that this reluctance is "rein-
force[d]" by a "lack of 'buy-in' on the assessment of risk underlying the requirements
... ." Id. (i.e., this reluctance is reinforced by the "belief that EPA's assessment[s] of
risks are often incorrect or not well-founded," id. at 23) (i.e., Criticism # 4, infra).
The DEKALB RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 1, captures the frustrations of munici-
palities relating to the growing number of unfunded environmental mandates suc-
cinctly, couching its recommendations as follows: (1) "no money, no mandates"-i.e.,
counties and cities should be relieved of their obligations to implement new mandates
unless funding is provided; and (2) "reimburse[ment] [of] local governments for the
costs of complying with existing federal mandates . .. ."
[Vol. 44:885
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In short, the position that many local governments have ar-
ticulated is that if the federal or state government believes that an
environmental requirement is important enough to implement, it
should fund its implementation.20
B. Lack of flexibility in the regulatory approach and The "Nth"
Degree/Negligible Risk Issue.
The Anchorage, Alaska report articulates the concern that the
existing environmental regulatory scheme lacks flexibility, thereby
sometimes requiring expenditures for "non-existent" problems:
[M]ayors take exception to paying for nonexistent problems. A
Florida mayor (where the water table in his city is within a few
feet of the surface) says costly controls for protecting ground-
water in his community are worth every cent. But he argues
other cities shouldn't necessarily have to abide by the same
rules. As he says, if "the water table is a thousand feet down,
it's dumb to waste money on groundwater." Another official
asked: "Why should we pay to test for pesticides that aren't even
used here?" 21
Echoing this concern, the EPA's report notes that:
Case study communities believe regulations are often too pre-
scriptive, requiring local governments to do work that does not
solve local environmental problems. In some cases, local offi-
cials argued that compliance with EPA requirements prescribes
an approach that they find inappropriate to their conditions, and
they believe they are denied the latitude to choose a different
approach.22
And it adds that, more specifically, "[i]n several case communities
local officials believed that EPA regulations required them to take
20. See, e.g., ANCHORAGE REPORT, supra note 3, at iv:
If recent private-sector and government forecasts are reliable indicators, to-
day's environmental programs will not be affordable tomorrow. Add to to-
day's costs the potential billions of dollars needed for pending and proposed
laws and regulations, and the nation's communities could well face irrevers-
ible ruin .... The United States Congress has created the problem. It is up
to Congress to fix it.
Id.; see also MAINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 ("If the Federal Government mandates
an expense through regulation, then the Federal Government should pay for it, not
the local property taxpayer.").
21. ANCHORAGE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-11.
22. EPA REPORT, supra note 5, at ii, 20-22.
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action to address an environmental threat that did not exist
locally."23
Similarly, in its policy recommendations to Congress and the
EPA for improving the country's environmental regulatory
scheme, the International City/County Management Association
Environmental Mandates Task Force highlighted the lack of flexi-
bility accorded municipalities in complying with federally-created
environmental mandates and called for change:
Local governments should be able to seek a waiver or exemp-
tion if they can show that the exposure model, risk assumptions,
or other factors that underlie a regulatory requirement are not
valid in their situation. In those cases, EPA or the state should
be authorized to provide a process such as an informal hearing
or to determine if a waiver or exemption from the requirements
is warranted.24
The Anchorage Report describes local governments' concern
that implementing certain environmental mandates will have, at
most, a negligible effect on health, stating as follows:
Mayors... want it understood that they aren't seeking to over-
throw environmental laws. They just don't like to waste money.
When they are forced to implement unfunded environmental
mandates that will, at best, have a negligible effect on health,
they get angry. They expect common sense in the policy arena,
23. Id. at 20. The call for more flexibility is echoed in an article by Edward F.
Hayes, Vice President for Research for Ohio State University and the chair of Colum-
bus, Ohio's Environmental Science Advisory Committee, in which Mr. Hayes uses
Columbus's experience with the Safe Drinking Water Act to support his call for addi-
tional flexibility, as follows:
New amendments to the SDWA illustrate both the rigidity and uncertainty
of some federal regs. Under the amendments, water utilities must analyze
drinking water for at least 133 specified pollutants, beginning in 1993. Many
of the substances are not present in significant quantities in Ohio. One of
them, DBCP, a chemical whose use was discontinued 15 years ago, was used
almost entirely on pineapples in Hawaii. EPA's promised guidelines on the
conduct of "vulnerability assessments"-which project local impacts of a
particular pollutant-to obtain local waivers have not appeared. Regula-
tions that let state and local governments develop their own water quality
programs could produce better results at lower costs.
Edward F. Hayes, What's a City to Do, EPA J., Jan.-Mar. 1993, at A16.
24. INTERNATIONAL CITY/CouNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION ENVIRONMEN-
TAL MANDATES TASK FORCE, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. CONGRESS
AND THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY [hereinafter ICMA POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS].
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and they expect a balance between needs of people and the
needs of the physical environment. Without balance, a regula-
tory backlash will be inevitable.
More and more, local officials say, if environmental policies
don't reflect community needs, they have no alternative but to
oppose them.25
Along, the same lines, the Anchorage Report provides:
Local officials respect the need for an umbrella of environmen-
tal regulations that responds to careless acts of the past and pre-
vents them in the future. What they don't respect or need are
edicts by distant bureaucracies to clean up the final "nth" de-
gree of a pollutant, regardless of its cost.26
Also related, some cities criticize what they characterize as
Congress' tendency to overcompensate for suspected dangers of
pollutants.27 In its report, the City of Lewiston, Maine articulates
this concern as follows: "The rules must meet the problem and not
25. ANCHORAGE REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.
26. Id. at 10.
27. Additionally, the New York Times' characterization of the approach that fed-
eral legislation has taken in light of the inherent uncertainty regarding the nature and
extent of environmental risks is that "[m]ore than 10 years ago, the Federal Govern-
ment adopted the view that when there is any doubt, it is better to take the prudent
approach than do nothing." Patch of Weeds, supra note 3, at A16. And, the Times'
assessment of this strategy was less than complimentary: "But a decade later, the eco-
nomic costs of this policy are painfully clear while the benefits remain largely un-
measurable." Id.
One of the resolutions that Dekalb County adopted makes the same point:
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that Congress and the Administration are
urged to include in any future mandate, a provision that requires federal
departments and agencies to provide scientifically sound assessments of pur-
ported health, safety or environmental risk prior to the imposition of any
new mandate on local governments ....
See DEKALB RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 2.
Senator Moynihan observed this trend toward local governments' questioning
the legitimacy of environmental regulatory objectives in a recent article:
Obviously, we are seeing a new trend. Federal environmental laws are
being questioned by state and local governments, which say they can't afford
to comply with all environmental laws.... An editorial in the Jan. 8, 1993,
issue of Science magazine alerts us to the "growing questioning of the factual
basis for federal command-and-control actions," all because of concerns
over regulatory costs. The message is clear. State and local governments
will hold Congress and EPA more accountable in the future about obligating
them to spend their resources on federal requirements. They will want
"proof" that there is a problem and confidence that the legislated solution
will solve it. California's threat to return enforcement of its drinking water
program to EPA last spring speaks volumes. The most environmentally ad-
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go beyond the ability to pay or an acceptable level of correc-
tion.... Base requirements on quality and 'bang for the buck' in-
stead of arbitrary requirements [are what is needed]."28 Several
members of Congress recently seemed to accept this criticism of
their actions. The New York Times summarized their views as
follows:
[O]ne lesson of environmental policy-making in the 1980's was
that acting on the basis of being safe rather than sorry had unin-
tended consequences. Not the least of them has been many
costly rules that are not producing measurable improvements in
public health or the environment. 29
In short, at least some local communities believe that the fed-
eral environmental requirements are overly rigid and that this de-
fect, together with a tendency to pursue a problem to the "nth
degree," raises significant cost-effectiveness and credibility issues.
C. Failure to Coordinate and to Prioritize Among Risks.
The critique of environmental regulation relating to a failure
to coordinate and prioritize, contains several components. First,
local officials complain that the EPA fails to look at environmental
problems systematically or prioritize among them.3 0 These officials
claim that there is not enough money to do everything at once.31
Accordingly, there is a need to analyze all of the environmental
protection and other needs that communities face and then de-
velop comprehensive strategies for addressing these needs in a pri-
oritized fashion that targets the worst problems first.
During the past few years, high ranking EPA officials have be-
vanced state in the Union close to rebellion-a sobering prospect. The Sci-
ence editorial suggests we are seeing the "beginning of a revolt."
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Legislative Proposal: Why not enact a law that would help
us set sensible priorities?, EPA J., Jan.-Mar. 1993, at 46.
28. MAINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
29. Keith Schneider, Second Chance on Environment: Opportunity to Redefine
Core of American Policy on Pollution, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 1993, at A17. The same
New York Times article indicates that the environmentalists' position is that requiring
stronger proof of risk before acting is "a recipe for "disaster," quoting Dr. Adam
Finkel of Resources for the Future: "As a scientist, we always hope to have more
research to answer complex questions .... But in 1993 we don't have the scientific
basis for rejecting the current approach, which says we should be prudent when faced
with uncertainty." Id.
30. See, e.g., CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
31. See, e.g., id. at 31.
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gun to voice this criticism, that the federal government fails either
to evaluate risks systematically or to prioritize among risks. For-
mer EPA Administrator Reilly often spoke about the need to pri-
oritize among risks.32 In 1989, he asked the EPA's Science
Advisory Board to "assess and compare different environmental
risks in light of the most recent scientific data ... and to recom-
mend improved methodologies for assessing and comparing risks
and risk reduction options in the future. '33 In its 1990 report, Re-
ducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies For Environmental
Protection,34 the Science Advisory Board highlighted the impor-
tance of matching resources to risks so that we tackle the worst
problems first, stating as follows:
The environment is an interrelated whole, and society's environ-
mental protection efforts should be integrated as well. Integra-
tion in this case means that government agencies should assess
the range of environmental problems of concern and then target
protective efforts at the problems that seem to be the most
serious.35
32. See e.g., William K. Reilly, The Future of Environmental Law, 6 YALE J. ON
REG. 351 (1989); Keith Schneider, New View Calls Environmental Policy Misguided,
N. Y. TIMES Mar. 21, 1993, at A30.
33. U.S.E.P.A., SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, SAB-EC-90-021, REDUCING RISK:
SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, at ii (Sept.
1990) [hereinafter REDUCING RISK].
34. See REDUCING RISK, supra note 33, at ii.
35. Id. at 1. In its March, 1993, testimony before Congress, the U.S. General
Accounting Office similarly recommended "the establishment of priorities among
EPA programs on the basis of risk to public health and the environment." Statement
of Richard L. Hembra, Director, Environmental Protection Issues, Resources, Com-
munity, and Economic Development Division, U.S. General Accounting Office Testi-
mony, Management Issues Facing the Environmental Protection Agency, before the
Legislation and National Security Subcommittee and the Environment, Energy and
Natural Resources Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, U.S.
House of Representatives (Mar. 29, 1993, at 3-5).
The ICMA Environmental Mandates Task Force has voiced similar concerns
about the EPA's failure to prioritize among risks:
Too often EPA targets enforcement actions without regard to other sources
of pollution that may be causing equal or greater harm to the environment.
Under Superfund, a small town in Wisconsin faces the prospect of paying
over $50 million to clean up two landfills that may be contaminating a creek.
Yet even after those sites are cleaned up, the creek will still be contaminated
by pollution from three other landfills, a golf course, airport, and agricultural
lands that drain into the creek. A regional plan would evaluate all of these
sources and decide what priority to give each instead of spending extraordi-
nary amounts on two sources while ignoring others.
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Former EPA General Counsel E. Donald Elliott made the same
point in a recent article:
This country is long overdue for a national debate on our poli-
cies toward environmental risk.... We cannot maintain forever
the fiction that we are rich enough (or foolish enough) to spend
whatever it takes to eliminate all risks, even trivial ones, in-
stantly from our environment. We must set rational priorities
based on the best science available and devote our limited re-
sources first to the areas where the opportunities for risk reduc-
tion are greatest.36
Second, and related, some cities criticize the regulatory
scheme for being "oriented more to public pressure and special in-
terest groups instead of a risk or science-based system. ' '37 Several
officials have termed the federal approach to environmental regu-
lation "reactive" to public fears, not responsive to scientific analy-
ses. As former EPA Administrator Reilly put it:
We need to develop a new system for taking action on the envi-
ronment that isn't based on responding to the nightly news....
What we have had in the United States is environmental
agenda-setting by episodic panic .... 38
ICMA POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 24, at 2.
36. E. Donald Elliott, Superfund: EPA Success, National Debacle?, 6 NAT'L RE-
SOURCES ENV'T 11, 148 (1992).
37. COLUMBUS STUDY, supra note 2, at 9; Browner Letter, infra note 41, at 2
(citing a need to "[i]mprove the science behind EPA's decision making," noting that
"many local governments ...question the health and environmental benefits of
EPA's requirements.").
In REDUCING RISK, the EPA's Science Advisory Board indicated its view that the
environmental laws "are more reflective of public perceptions of risk than of scientific
understanding of risk." REDUCING RISK, supra note 33, at A30.
38. Keith Schneider, New View Calls Environmental Policy Misguided, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993, at Al, A30. The same article indicates that Richard D. Morgen-
stern, the acting administrator for policy planning and evaluation at the EPA, explains
the problem this way: "our society is very reactive, and when concerns are raised
people want action.... We're now in the position of saying in quite a few of our
programs, 'Oops, we made a mistake.'" Id. at A30.
At least some local government officials appear to share this concern, as re-
flected by the following statement in a recent ICMA Newsletter:
More and more frequently, state and local officials, public health officers,
and even many scientists agree that legislation is not based on sound re-
search. According to a New York Times article of March 21, 1993, panic
and popular perceptions of risk guide the formulation of many environmen-
tal statutes. For example, after government scientists concluded that asbes-
tos was a carcinogen, Congress reacted to public hysteria and passed the
1985 law that led cities and states to spend $15 to $20 billion to remove it
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Third, and also related, there is the sense that the focus of at-
tention is constantly shifting from one set of problems to another,
instead of identifying certain major concerns that require priority
attention. This constant shifting of priorities and focus, and the
continual establishment of new obligations and the revision of ex-
isting requirements, creates an enormous burden on local govern-
ments simply to stay current, to understand the content of current
environmental requirements, and to plan and budget to meet these
constantly shifting obligations.3 9
Fourth, the Columbus Study identifies concerns that are inher-
ent in the current media-specific approach and the resulting failure
to evaluate problems (and possible solutions) holistically:
With the passage of the above mandates comes a myriad of fed-
eral and state agencies that are now responsible for assuring
compliance. This has imposed additional burdens on local gov-
ernment because the enforcing agencies lack coordination.
They take a single issue compliance schedule approach.40
from schools and public buildings. However, three years ago EPA com-
pleted research that found asbestos removal may actually cause more harm
than good.
Unfunded Federal Mandates, ENVIRONMENTAL PARTNERSHIPS, THE NEWSLETrER OF
ICMA's ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS, Fall 1993, at 6.
Finally, even members of Congress appear to accept some of the blame. Accord-
ing to a March 26, 1993, New York Times' article: "Several leading members [of Con-
gress] said that too often Congress has moved from panic to panic and not developed
a uniform approach to consider risks. .. ." Keith Schneider, Second Chance on Envi-
ronment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1993, at A17.
39. EPA REPORT, supra note 5, at ii ("All of the communities interviewed noted
that both the increasing volume of regulatory requirements, as well as the fact that
regulations and standards do not stay static, pose significant problems and costs for
them across several different environmental services."). Id. at 18 ("The climate of
uncertainty... over what regulation will be published and when, and what the regula-
tion will require, makes it difficult for local officials to plan and budget for the
future.").
40. COLUMBUS STUDY, supra note 2, at 6.
ICMA's Environmental Mandates Task Force made a related recommendation
that the EPA begin to shift from a media-specific approach to a more comprehensive
one in its letter to Administrator Browner, noting as follows that the EPA should
focus on achieving integrated environmental goals and not on unduly rigid prescrip-
tions for action:
EPA should change its orientation from rigid regulation toward focusing on
goals and goal attainment schedules .... EPA's watershed, estuary, and
other geographic-specific initiatives are good models for taking multimedia,
ecosystem approaches with clearly defined environmental goals. To the ex-
tent possible, EPA should promote similar initiatives in other areas such as
the clean up of contaminated properties .... EPA has begun to issue rules
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In sum, local officials, and many federal officials as well, be-
lieve that the federal government needs to shift to a new paradigm
for addressing environmental problems. This new paradigm would
involve (1) to the extent feasible, using "good science" systemati-
cally to define the environmental problems most in need of atten-
tion; and (2) evaluating a local government's environmental
problems comprehensively and developing strategies and priorities
based on this complete understanding of the problems that need
attention.
D. "Process Flaws:" (1) Onerous Paperwork Requirements; (2)
A Lack of Credibility Concerning the Cost of
Complying; and 3) A Lack of "Partnership."
In addition to the substantive concerns discussed above, local
governments also raise a number of "process" issues relating to
federal environmental regulation. One such criticism relates to the
heavy paperwork requirements that federal and state regulatory
requirements impose, combined with a practice of underestimating
the cost of preparing such paperwork. According to the Anchorage
Report, the EPA's approach in the stormwater arena is a case in
point:
that affect industrial sectors such as the pulp and paper industry and steel
industry in "clusters." These rules cover several media so that air, water,
and other requirements are considered at one time. They are effective for
five or more years, thus enabling the affected industry to plan with the cer-
tainty of these requirements. Local governments would also benefit from a
similarly integrated, multi-media approach to rules that affect them. EPA
should create a work group including representatives of local governments
to explore the development of such a rule making.
Browner Letter, infra note 41, at 2-3.
For a thorough discussion of the need for a "holistic," or "integrated," approach
in dealing with the environment, see Frances H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework for
Preventing Pollution and Protecting the Environment, 22 ENVTL. L. 1 (1992).
There are not 11 different environments, each defined by a major statute.
There are not even 25 different environments, each defined by a congres-
sional committee jurisdiction. In fact, there is but 1 natural environment.
The components of that natural environment are interrelated in many com-
plex ways, and pollutants tend to travel from one part of the environment to
the other.
Id. at 6 (citing THE CONSERVATION FOUND., NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POLLUTION
CONTROL: CROss-MEDIA PROBLEMS 1 (1985)). For a discussion of the need for an
integrated approach specifically relating to ocean law and the law of the sea, see Mar-
tin H. Belsky, The Ecosystem Model Mandate for a Comprehensive United States
Ocean Policy and Law of the Sea, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 417 (1989).
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Anchorage Municipal Engineer Ross B. Dunfee contends "EPA
deserves a public flogging for its extraordinarily bad estimating
in determining the cost to file the municipal stormwater applica-
tion." Anchorage is spending an unexpected $1.5 million to file
its Part I application, not the less-than-$50,000 projected by the
EPA; "only" a thirty-fold miscalculation.
Other stormwater permit coordinators report similar high
costs. They speculate EPA deliberately underestimated the per-
mit costs so it would not be subject to the national threshold
limits established by Executive Order 12291, which requires a
more thorough analysis. Had that analysis been performed, the
legislative outcome might have been more responsible.41
Local governments also charge that the federal government
does not view local governments as partners. They believe that this
feeling is manifested in several areas. First, communities feel that
the EPA fails to share information with them.42 As a result, as the
EPA's report notes, local officials are "not kept informed of federal
environmental requirements. '43 Therefore, local governments
"often [are] unaware of EPA requirements or [become] informed
about the regulations after an important deadline has passed." 44
Second, at least some communities apparently believe their rela-
tionship with the EPA is more adversarial than cooperative. As
the EPA Report notes:
Case study communities are dissatisfied with the current Fed-
eral-Local relationship-which they view as often more adver-
sarial than cooperative. Local officials believe they are not
treated respectfully as partners in environmental protection
41. ANCHORAGE REPORT, supra note 3, at 14. In its January 20, 1993, letter to
EPA Administrator Carol Browner, the ICMA Environmental Task Force noted that
this concern, relating to the EPA's underestimating costs, is not limited to completing
paperwork, but instead applies to compliance with its requirements generally, provid-
ing as follows: "Frequently EPA's estimates for the cost of compliance do not reflect
the costs to local governments or are off by orders of magnitude." Letter from Envi-
ronmental Mandates Task Force to Carol Browner, at 3 [hereinafter Browner Letter].
Professor Hopkins notes that "any regulator has a natural incentive to estimate
conservatively the costs it is imposing on others. Those who must comply with the
regulations tend not surprisingly to believe their actual costs exceed these estimates
... " FILLING THE GAPS, supra note 16, at 13.
42. See e.g., EPA REPORT, supra note 5, at 18 (["local governments... obtain[
information more often from private consultants and supply vendors than from the
Federal Register.").





Third, the EPA Report notes that several local officials criti-
cized the federal environmental regulatory process on the ground
that "they had very little opportunity to contribute to the develop-
ment of EPA regulations in order to make them more implement-
able at the local level. '46
Thus, at least some local officials feel that they are being told
what to do; that they do not have a meaningful opportunity to offer
their views; and that these already serious problems are exacer-
bated by the EPA's failure to have adequate lines of communica-
tion to ensure that local governments are aware of their
responsibilities, its imposition of burdensome paperwork require-
ments, and its flawed estimates of the costs of compliance.
II. PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS CONCERNING POSSILE
STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS FEDERAL/LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TENSIONS
A. Recognizing that a Problem Exists.
The first step in addressing the criticisms that local govern-
ments are making regarding federal environmental mandates is to
determine whether these criticisms have merit. The federal gov-
ernment appears to have taken this step and concluded that adjust-
ments to its environmental regulatory scheme are warranted. First,
45. Id. at iii. One local government representative pointed to an EPA Guidance
document as an example of what is wrong with the EPA's attitude toward local gov-
ernments. This representative noted her view that the title of the document, "Using
State and Local Officials to Assist in Community Relations," spoke volumes. Using
State and Local Officials to Assist in Community Relations (OSWER Directive
#9230.0-17) (Sept. 28, 1990).
46. EPA REPORT, supra note 5, at 27. In its letter to Administrator Browner,
ICMA's Environmental Mandates Task Force makes the same point, citing a need to
'Jo]pen the Regulatory Development Process," and "strongly recommend[ing] that
EPA ensure that local governments and other stakeholders have an opportunity to
participate in a regulatory negotiation or advisory process before a regulation is pro-
posed .... [Liocal governments should have a role in developing the regulations they
will ultimately be responsible for implementing." Browner Letter, supra note 41, at 1.
The Meeting Notes from the March 5, 1993, ICMA Environmental Mandates
Task Force reflect that one local government official said that "the idea of partnership
only exists when discussing who will pay for the mandates." MEETING No=S, supra
note 10, at 7. This official continued that "[liocal governments are not involved in
developing regulations.... [and] that it is difficult to be a partner to someone who
[will] not allow you to play a role in the process." Id.
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the statements from President Clinton and Senator Dole quoted
above reflect a recognition that unfunded mandates do not come
without cost, even though the money does not come from the fed-
eral treasury.47
Second, high level EPA officials in both the Bush and Clinton
Administrations have acknowledged that the federal requirements
are partly to blame for the tensions between the local and federal
governments. In September, 1992, then EPA Deputy Administra-
tor F. Henry Habicht II said that the EPA is "rethinking its rela-
tionship with local governments" in light of the escalating costs of
environmental compliance. 48 He also indicated that the EPA rec-
ognized that some mandates required "inefficient and ineffective
expenditures," and he said that the EPA was trying to improve its
approach to environmental regulation to eliminate these expendi-
tures. 49 Current EPA Administrator Carol Browner, in testimony
she gave to Congress on March 31, 1993, acknowledged the need
for providing "relief" to local governments from environmental
mandates:
State, tribal and local governments feel overwhelmed by the
breadth, complexity and cost of existing environmental needs,
mandates and expectations, and must get some relief. If States,
tribes, and local governments fail in their environmental man-
agement efforts, and they are in danger of failing, the EPA
fails.... Responsible stewardship of the nation's environmental
agenda requires exercising the utmost leadership in bringing to-
gether the best of federal efforts and State, tribal, and local
efforts.50
Third, institutionally, the EPA has begun to investigate this is-
sue and has reached the same conclusion. First, as noted above, in
August, 1993, the EPA issued what it termed its first report on the
cumulative impact of environmental mandates on local govern-
47. In October 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12875 for the
purpose of curtailing the creation of unfunded environmental mandates by Executive
agencies. 58 Fed. Reg. 58,093 (1993).
48. 23 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1430, 1430 (Sept. 18, 1992).
49. Id.
50. Testimony of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, before the Comm. on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, (Mar.
31, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Browner Testimony]; see also Browner Says
EPA Will Pursue Flexibility in Dealings With State, Local Governments, 24 ENV'T
REP. (BNA), at 358-59 (June 25, 1993).
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ments.51 This report found that local governments experience a
wide variety of problems implementing and complying with envi-
ronmental mandates, including: (1) financial problems, (2) ineffec-
tive communication, (3) uncertainty about future requirements,
and (4) a lack of governmental partnership between the EPA and
local governments. 52 Second, in its December 18, 1992, report enti-
tled "Environmental Requirements for Local Governments Dia-
logue Group," the EPA noted that the federal-local "partnership"
has changed dramatically-concluding that from origins based on
federal support for local environmental protection efforts, this
partnership now is characterized by aggressive mandates:
The original theory of providing environmental protection by
means of a federal/state/local partnership by furnishing federal
support-through financial and technical assistance-has been
lost through a heavier emphasis on aggressive Federal regula-
tion and mandates. An increasing number of local governments
now lack the financial resources to meet the publicly prescribed
requirements. Environmental statutes, regulations, and imple-
mentation procedures too frequently rely on incomplete cost,
needs, and scientific data. Moreover, for a variety of reasons-
some statutorily imposed, some imposed through administrative
discretion-there is insufficient flexibility for local jurisdictions
to adapt to the distinctive, specific characteristics of individual
areas. Therefore, the limited resources available are not being
used to address the most pressing health and environmental
problems. The result is less than optimal environmental
protection.53
In short, it appears that the federal government has begun to
recognize not only that tension exists, but that some of the local
governments' criticisms have merit.5 4
51. EPA REPORT, supra note 5. According to this report, "no study had previ-
ously been undertaken by EPA or any outside group to provide Agency decision mak-
ers with both a multi-media perspective and a multi-issue characterization of the types
of problems being experienced by local governments in implementing EPA man-
dates." Id. at 1.
52. Id. at 15.
53. U.S.E.P.A., ADVISORY COMMITTEE CHARTER, ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, POLICY DIALOGUE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, at 1
(Dec. 18, 1992).
54. Laurie Goodman, then EPA Associate Administrator for Regional Opera-
tions and State/Local Relations, predicted in March 1993, that "the environmental
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B. Addressing the Funding Issue.
It appears to be virtually undisputed that along with the in-
crease in mandates, federal financial contributions to local govern-
ment efforts to meet federal mandates have decreased dramatically
in recent years.55 This funding-portion issue has two components.
First, to what extent (if any) is it appropriate for the federal gov-
ernment to subsidize or otherwise provide financial support to lo-
cal governments in their efforts to meet federal environmental
mandates? Second, if such financial support is appropriate, what
form should it take?
In terms of whether the federal government should provide
funding support to local governments, the EPA's report notes that
local governments play a dual role, acting both as public service
providers and regulated entities:
Although local governments are one of the largest sectors of the
regulated community, they are different from other regulated
entities in their provision of essential services to the public. As
a result, local governments are an integral part of the public sec-
tor environmental management framework ...and should
therefore be treated differently than other regulated entities.
EPA needs to change the way it... interacts with local govern-
ments-which is primarily as regulated entities comparable to
private industry-and achieve a balance between interacting
with local governments in their role as public service entities
and in their role as regulated entities.5 6
Regarding their activities as public service providers, it ap-
pears to be widely accepted that local governments may warrant
some level of federal financial support.5 7 More sophisticated anal-
ysis, however, needs to be given to the appropriate parameters for
financial assistance. For example, the case seems to be stronger for
federal financial assistance to fund environmental mandates relat-
mandates issue will preoccupy the Clinton administration just as the wetlands issue
did the Bush administration." ANCHORAGE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
55. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
56. EPA REPORT, supra note 5, at iv, 29-31 (emphasis omitted).
57. See, e.g., Browner Testimony, supra note 50, at 8; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAMS: STATE CAPACITY TASK FORCE, THE ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHA-
NISMS TEAM REPORT, FINAL DRAFr 1 (Aug. 7, 1992); ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCIAL
ADVISORY BOARD, PUBLIC SECTOR OPTIONS TO FINANCE ENVIRONMENTAL FACILI-
TIES 1 (Mar. 13, 1992).
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ing to a local government's provision of a public service such as a
water supply, than it is for funding environmental mandates relat-
ing to a local government's carrying out other functions, such as
operating municipal golf courses.
Concerning the forms of financial assistance, the federal gov-
ernment needs to be creative in evaluating and establishing alter-
native mechanisms. Local governments obviously would welcome
renewed and expanded use of the grants approach employed under
the Clean Water Act for funding water treatment plants.58 The era
of such grants, however, appears to have ended and seems unlikely
to be revived, given the federal government's budget constraints. 59
Other approaches that the federal government is using include the
State Revolving Fund loan program, also for Clean Water Act
water treatment plants,6° and the Clean Air Act requirement that
states which seek to administer the Clean Air Act create funding
sources that will ensure an adequate infrastructure to implement
these responsibilities. 61
In exploring funding options, the federal government should
evaluate the efficacy of strategies being used at the state level. 62
Two examples from the New York State experience are instructive.
58. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1299 (1988); see also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE
GUIDE: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW § 18.14[1] (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1992) [herein-
after ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACricE GUIDE].
59. See sources cited supra note 58.
60. 33 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1988); see also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE
GUIDE, supra note 58, § 18.14[3].
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1988). The latter approach will be of use for situ-
ations in which local governments are acting as the regulator charged with overseeing
implementation of an environmental mandate by others.
62. As Justice Brandeis said in his famous dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), the states may serve as the "laboratories" of "social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." Id. at 311.
Paradoxically, the CHICAGO REPORT suggests that mandates undermine the con-
tribution as "laboratories" that local governments otherwise might make:
The imposition of unfunded federal mandates upon state and local govern-
ments undermines their role as laboratories of democracy in two ways. The
continually expanding slice of the state and local budgetary pie consumed by
unfunded federal mandates crowds out funding for non-mandated state and
local governmental services and programs. Taxes cannot be raised continu-
ally. This results in a stifling of experimentation and innovation. Local
problems and concerns often go unrecognized in Washington.
Additionally, the mandated areas themselves are largely immune from
state and local modification to suit local needs and conditions.
CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
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First, in July, 1993, the State enacted the New York State Environ-
mental Protection Act.63 This Act creates a revenue stream that is
devoted to environmental programs.64 Among other purposes,
these funds may be used:
to design, acquire, construct, improve and install certain landfill
closure, waste reduction, recycling, solid waste management
planning, park and protected area[s], local waterfront revitaliza-
tion plans and secondary materials marketing projects, and...
open space conservation projects, including the provision of
assistance to local governments.65
Second, New York State has created a legislative scheme that
provides a State subsidy to municipalities for their share of liability
for State Superfund sites for which they are liable because of their
status as owner or operator of the site.66 This program of providing
state funding for municipally owned or operated sites appears to
have facilitated the expeditious handling of such sites. At least one
commentator has strongly urged that the willingness by municipali-
ties to bear a portion of the cleanup costs greatly promotes partici-
63. Environmental Protection Act, Act of Nov. 28, 1990, ch. 43-B, § 3, 1993 N.Y.
Laws 610 (codified at N.Y. ENVTL. CON ERV. LAW §§ 54-0101 to 54-1301 (McKinney
1993 and Supp. 1994)).
64. Enactment of this Act followed several years of failed attempts to create a
fund for local governments, including the attempt in 1990 to pass an "Environmental
Bond Act." The concept of an ongoing revenue stream may actually preferable to
that of a Bond Act, since a Bond Act is a fixed sum that eventually will run out. In
contrast, the Environmental Protection Act is designed to produce revenue annually
for municipalities to use to meet their environmental obligations.
In enacting this law, the legislature explained its rationale as follows:
The legislature finds and determines that there is a need to assure that the
state has the capacity to protect the environment and public health, safety
and welfare through the provision of assistance to state agencies, public ben-




66. Under New York law, municipal owners and operators are eligible to receive
75% funding of their share of the cost of investigating and remediating a Superfund
site, if they meet certain conditions. In particular, to become eligible for a state con-
tribution to its remedial obligations, a municipality must, inter alia, sign an Order
committing it to conduct the work deemed necessary by the State's Department of
Environmental Conservation. In addition, the municipality, under this Order, must
commit to make all reasonable efforts to secure payments from other responsible par-
ties and it must make such efforts to obtain coverage from its insurers. N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 27-1313 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 6, § 375.2 (1986).
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pation by private parties, and it is clear that the State commitment
to fund seventy five percent of the municipality's share contributes
to the municipality's willingness to come forward.67
In sum, assuming the policy judgment that federal financial
assistance is appropriate to help local governments meet federally
required environmental infrastructure needs, the federal govern-
ment should systematically determine where such assistance is ap-
propriate and most needed, and it should look to state as well as
federal experience in designing financial assistance strategies.
C. Lack of Flexibility and Negligible Risk.
Creating adequate flexibility in our environmental regulatory
system is an immense challenge. This is so in part because this ob-
jective competes, to some extent, with two other extremely impor-
tant components of environmental regulation: (1) the need to keep
things as simple as possible for ease of administration of our regu-
latory system;68 and (2) the critical role that the federal govern-
ment plays in maintaining a level playing field throughout the
country.69 One relatively straightforward fix is to improve the vari-
ance process that is designed to allow for flexibility within this na-
tional regulatory framework to accommodate individual
differences. In particular, the federal government needs to change
67. Norman Bernstein, To Clean Up Landfills, the Leader Should be Municipali-
ties Using Economic Incentives to Settle, 19 Env. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,012 (Jan.
1989); see also Peter H. Lehner, Act Locally: Municipal Enforcement of Environmen-
tal Law, 12 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 50, 59 (1993).
The New York State Superfund Management board, in its 7th Annual Evaluation
of the New York State Hazardous Waste Site Remediation Program notes that
[b]y 1996 it is expected that $500 million of the EQBA will have been
awarded to local governments to remediate municipally-owned or operated
sites which do contain hazardous waste and are listed on the state inactive
hazardous waste site registry. Thus a total of $600 million or 50 percent of
the original EQBA will be committed to municipal landfill remediation.
STATE SUPERFUND MANAGEMENT BOARD, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE: 7TH ANNUAL EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITE REMEDIATION PROGRAM 1 (Jan. 1, 1993).
68. David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund Program: Proposals for Strengthen-
ing the Federal/State Relationship, 18 WM. & MARY J. OF ENVTL. L. 1, 89-90 (1993).
69. For an example of how the federal government attempts to maintain a level
playing field throughout the country, see David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund
Program: Proposals for Strengthening the Federal/State Relationship, 18 WM. & MARY
J. OF ENVTL. L. at 53-54. See also Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1042 n.46
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
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its structure to avoid situations such as that recounted by Mr.
Hayes, Vice President for Research for Ohio State University, in
which the EPA sets national standards and, while promising to es-
tablish variance procedures later on, experiences delays in this sec-
ond phase that greatly reduce needed flexibility in the regulatory
scheme.70 The federal government's practice should be to create
national standards and variance procedures simultaneously, so that
it immediately can begin to apply these standards in a reasonable
way, including allowing variances from them when appropriate.
Other strategies undoubtedly would help to balance these objec-
tives as well. One of the primary charges of the Advisory Commit-
tee that has been established to address the application of
environmental regulations to local governments should be to de-
velop such strategies.
D. Revisiting Substantive Norms.
Perhaps the most difficult task for the federal government is
revisiting the appropriateness of some of its requirements. Some
commentators have suggested that the federal government rarely
reduces its requirements and that changes almost always are in the
direction of additional regulation.71
This is the area of future debate as to which environmental
groups are likely to be most leery. As the New York Times noted,
one of the issues that the "nascent movement" to revisit regula-
tions raises is whether environmentalists will realize their "fear
[that] the issue of cumulative burden may become a Trojan horse
for deregulation. ' 72
70. See supra note 23.
71. In a recent article, the New York Times quoted Robert Hahn, an economist
at the American Enterprise Institute, to the same effect: "I can think of no instance in
which Congress has relaxed environmental regulations .... It's just not politically
correct." Peter Passell, Disputed New Role for Polls: Putting a Price Tag on Nature,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at A36. But cf Keith Schneider, U.S. Set to Open National
Forests for Strip Mining, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1992, at Al ("For the past 15 months,
President Bush has pressed for changes in environmental regulations, and he suc-
ceeded in relaxing restrictions on filling wetlands, cutting timber, exploring for oil,
and mining copper, uranium and other minerals on Federal land.").
72. Patch of Weeds, supra note 3, at A16. In Patch of Weeds, the New York Times
recognizes the potential "generalizability" of this concept:
After the city issued a report on its problems, all of a sudden Columbus's
leaders were joined by hundreds of city officials, state leaders and many pri-
vate homeowners across the country, as they advocate a cause that until now
1993] 911
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In light of the EPA's expertise and its role of maintaining a
"level playing field" throughout the country, some argue that it is
and should be the federal government's responsibility to establish
national standards of acceptable risk.73 Several local government
representatives, however, have challenged the quality of the fed-
eral government's performance in carrying out this and related re-
sponsibilities. For example, they have criticized the philosophy
big business has been arguing most forcefully: that many of the nation's envi-
ronmental laws bring enormous expense for little gain.
Id. Moreover, local governments are not the only regulated parties paying more to
comply with environmental regulations. According to one EPA official, "[n]ationally,
this country is spending roughly 2 percent of gross national product on environmental
compliance. This will rise to 3 percent by the year 2000." ANCHORAGE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 4.
73. Numerous commentators have urged a need for uniform national environ-
mental standards, in a variety of contexts. In connection with Superfund, for exam-
ple, Lance Miller, the Vice President of the Association of State and Territorial Solid
Waste Management Officials ("ASTSWMO"), suggested that,
U.S. EPA's role in a delegated Superfund program [should] first and fore-
most be to ensure the proper implementation of the program throughout the
nation thereby providing all citizens are equally protected from the effects of
contaminated sites.... U.S. EPA could be responsible for.., establishing
national guidance and policy;... In particular, U.S. EPA should focus efforts
on establishing guidance for national cleanup approaches, standards, and/or
methodologies to ensure cleanup decision consistency.
Testimony of the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials
(ASTSWMO) for the Hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcomm. on
Transp. and Hazardous Materials on the Issue of State Role in Superfund, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 15-16 (Oct. 28, 1993) (statement of Lance Miller, Assistance Commissioner
of Site Remediation for the New Jersey Dep't of Environmental Protection and En-
ergy, and Vice President of ASTSWMO) (emphasis added).
Also, in order to improve the functioning of environmental programs on a na-
tionwide basis and soothe relations between federal and state authorities, "EPA
should retain substantial responsibilities both for managing nondelegated sites and for
ensuring that the remediation process under both Federal and State programs is pro-
ceeding effectively and efficiently. The Agency's specific responsibilities should in-
clude . . .conducting research, setting national standards, and pursuing innovative
technologies ... ." Testimony before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materi-
als Comm. on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, on the Role of
the States in Superfund, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (Oct. 28, 1993) (statement of Dr.
Edwin H. Clark, II, President, Clean Sites, Inc.) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Na-
tional Governors' Association, in a Policy Statement adopted in August, 1993, recog-
nizes that,
EPA, states, and responsible parties have been hampered in site cleanup de-
cisions by the lack of a clear definition of "how clean is clean." EPA should
be directed to work in close cooperation with states to develop criteria or
guidelines for the national contingency plan on the level of remedial action
that is acceptable to protect public health and the environment.
NATiONAL GOVEmORS' ASSOCIATION, Policy, NR-5.2, at 1 (Aug. 1993).
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that it is better to be "safe than sorry," and that, given the uncer-
tainty surrounding the risks associated with exposure to toxic and
other pollutants, it is appropriate to over-rather than under-
regulate these pollutants.74 Further, they have challenged the
EPA's basic methodologies for assessing degree of risk.75
Resolving these issues is beyond the scope of this article. They
currently are receiving considerable attention.76 One point that de-
serves highlighting, however, is the need for the federal govern-
ment to improve its consistency in approaching these issues.
Different regulatory programs differ dramatically in the amount of
risk they tolerate. For example, cleanups under the federal
Superfund program generally are much more stringent and much
more expensive than are cleanups under the Underground Storage
Tank (UST) program.77 Such inconsistencies need to be identified
and justified or eliminated.
E. The Need for More Comprehensive Regulatory Approaches.
The federal government needs to continue to move in the di-
rection of evaluating the entire landscape of environmental con-
cerns comprehensively, rather than from a piecemeal, media-
specific perspective. The overriding question in this area is
whether the EPA has the ability (and the will) to make this change
through administrative adjustments, or whether legislative changes
are needed as well.
Numerous institutional impediments exist to shifting to a
multi-media, or holistic, approach to identifying and solving envi-
ronmental problems. First, Congress' structure is not conducive to
such an approach. A multitude of different committees share juris-
diction for environmental legislation. 78 Ensuring coordination
among these disparate groups is a significant impediment to com-
prehensive analysis. The division of responsibility between Con-
gressional committees responsible for environmental legislation
74. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
75. See COLUMBUS STUDY, supra note 2, at 9; see also note 32 and accompanying
text.
76. See generally Browner Testimony, supra note 50.
77. See Markell supra note 68, at n.200.
78. See generally Congress' Environmental Turf, THE ENVT'L FORUM, Jan./Feb.
1994, at 34; Richard J. Lazurus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of
EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Costodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1991).
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and those vested with responsibility for appropriations is an addi-
tional impediment.7 9
The extensive number of media-oriented environmental stat-
utes is a second barrier to coordinated decision making. Different
statutes create different mandates for action with their own time
frames.80 These mandates typically are established without regard
to the other items on the "EPA's plate"; their existence as in-
dependent obligations serves as an impediment to rational, coordi-
nated decision making. For all of these reasons, some
commentators have concluded that legislative change is needed if
the environmental regulatory structure is to be improved
significantly.8'
The EPA's own institutional structure also guarantees media-
specific concerns a prominent voice and complicates the evaluation
of problems from a multi-media perspective. To a significant ex-
tent, the EPA is organized by media (e.g., there is an Office of Air
and Radiation, an Office of Water, and an Office for Solid Waste
and Emergency Response).8 2
It is not clear whether the EPA is capable of comprehensive
analyses of environmental issues, given its current institutional
structure and the structure of its governing statutes and of Con-
gress itself.8 3 In a recent article, two EPA employees raised this
issue as well, stating as follows:
Is there a better way to organize EPA? The agency has long
been structured according to media-air, water, land-often
limiting individual programs to a specific environmental prob-
lem. The result-isolated, sometimes fragmented, programs-
often leads to cases where an industry [or local government] is
subject to repetitive or even competing regulations from various
EPA offices.84
79. See Lazurus, supra note 78.
80. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671a (Supp. 11 1990); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988).
81. ACIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
82. In addition to these media-specific offices, there are offices with a broader
focus (e.g., the Offices of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, General Counsel,
and Policy, Planning and Evaluation).
83. The COLUMBUS STUDY raised the failure of the federal government to coor-
dinate internally. COLUMBUS STUDY supra note 2, at 6.
84. Wendy Cleland-Hamnett & Joe Retzer, Crossing Agency Boundaries, THE
ENVTL. FORUM, Mar./April 1993, at 17.
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They continue that the EPA's recent use of "an innovative manage-
ment tool, 'the regulatory cluster,' helps to avoid these potential
problems." They describe such clusters as follows: "These clusters
combine broad, cross-cutting issues, directing action to our overall
mission rather than to more narrow, program-specific concerns."85
Similarly, the Anchorage Report notes that the EPA's "cluster"-
oriented strategies towards the pulp and paper industry hold prom-
ise within the existing structure and deserve careful review as an
alternative to a more fundamental realignment of responsibility.86
In this early period of her administration, Administrator
Browner needs to evaluate the viability of the existing EPA struc-
ture,8 7 and determine whether to retain this structure in its current
form or refine it.88 One sign that Administrator Browner is not
completely comfortable with the existing structure is her recent de-
cision to centralize more fully the enforcement function within the
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, reducing the
power and autonomy of the media-specific offices.89
The EPA also should analyze the implications of its governing
statutory scheme, and the nature of Congressional oversight, and
develop an analysis of what changes, if any, should be made in the
Legislative branch to facilitate a more comprehensive approach to
environmental issues in this country.90
85. Id.
86. Browner Letter, supra note 41, at 3.
87. See Alfred A. Marcus, EPA's Organizational Structure, 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (1991), for a description of the EPA's organizational structure, and a discus-
sion of how the current structure evolved.
88. As one part of such an analysis, the Administrator might review the myriad
of EPA efforts listed in the Appendix of the EPA REPORT referred to in note 5, supra,
that are currently ongoing and are planned to address local governments. It would be
worthwhile for EPA, working with a group of local government officials, to "audit"
these groups, clearinghouses, handbooks, technical assistance efforts, and internal ef-
forts. The EPA should evaluate these efforts comprehensively to determine whether
collectively they are meeting the needs of local governments, and how they can be
improved, including whether a different institutional structure, including one organ-
ized by type of regulated entity, would be more effective and efficient.
89. SUPERFUND REPORT, July 28, 1993, at 27; ENV'T REP., July 30, 1993, at 547
("Browner said the move to centralization would lead to stronger enforcement, which
she said is the 'backbone of environmental protection.' It would also produce a
greater emphasis on multimedia enforcement."); Steven A. Herman, The Reorganiza-
tion of EPA's Enforcement Function, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., (Aug. 1993), at
13-14.
90. Senate Bill 965, also known as the Toxic Cleanup Equity Act of 1993, which
Senator Lautenberg introduced in May 1993, suggests the need to evaluate problems
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systematically in an even broader context. See S. 965, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Intended for the Superfund arena, it would codify the principle that the extent of a
municipality's liability should be linked to its ability to pay. Id. Further, it would
require that the EPA's analysis of a municipality's ability to pay include an analysis of
a municipality's other environmental obligations. Id. And, it also provides that if a
settlement demand "would lead to a significant, demonstrable risk that the local gov-
ernment would be forced into bankruptcy, default, or budgetary cutbacks that would
unduly impede public health and safety activities, EPA will be required to tailor its
settlement demands accordingly." Id. In proposing this legislation, Senator
Lautenberg explained his reason for linking Superfund settlements to a municipality's
ability to fulfill its other public health and safety obligations as follows: "You cannot
get blood out of a stone-particularly if you end up cannibalizing other public health
and safety obligations." Id.
In this bill received the support not only of municipal groups, but also of environ-
mental groups. Id. Senator Lautenberg indicated support from the Sierra Club, the
Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the U.S. Pub-
lic Interest Research Group, and Friends of the Earth, as well as support from local
government groups such as the National League of Cities, the National Association of
Counties, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the National Association of Towns and
Townships. Id. Senator Lautenberg noted that,
as these endorsements suggest, there will be no sacrifice in environmental
protection here. [W]hat we will assure through the legislation is the consid-
eration of appropriate, special constraints and repercussions on a local gov-
ernment's ability to pay for a Superfund judgment. If we don't do so, we
may end up hurting, not helping, the public health and safety of our citizens.
Id. This recognition that environmental liability concerns need to be considered to-
gether with local governments' other public health and safety obligations suggests that
accommodation may be possible between those who are concerned with municipal
budgets and municipal ability to fulfill existing mandates, and members of the envi-
ronmental community who have tended to take a more narrow view of municipal
responsibilities.
The ANCHORAGE REPORT favors such a broad approach:
Too few policymakers considering the advisability of a particular regula-
tion ask how their costs will affect the individuals who pay for them. What
are the increased rates of accidents, illness, premature death and social up-
heaval-to name likely outcomes-from diet deficiencies, inadequate child
care, substandard housing and lack of health insurance when scarce family
resources go instead to pay for this regulation?
A case in point, Boston's water and sewer bills rose 39% over the past
two years to pay for cleaning up Boston Harbor .... Water shutoffs tripled
during that period .... Officials say that was only the beginning, that more
than 100,000 households are having trouble paying their utility bills, forcing
them to cut back on food, clothing and medical care .... One reason given
as to why impacts on consumers are given little consideration is that it has
been virtually impossible to predict costs on a per capita or per household
basis. Congress needs this information when debating the costs versus bene-
fits of environmental proposals .... The public health risks of economic
devastation may be difficult to quantify, but they are no less significant than
the public health risks of pollution.
ANCHORAGE REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
In its report, Lewiston, Maine similarly notes as follows:
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F. "Process Fixes."
The EPA should continue its efforts to involve local govern-
ments (and other members of the regulated community) in the
early stages of rule and policy development. 91 Among other steps,
the EPA should continue its efforts to foster meaningful involve-
ment through use of the negotiated rulemaking process. 92 More
extensive local involvement, if taken seriously by both the federal
government and local government participants, should help in
terms of improving the sense of partnership; improving the sub-
stance of the rules; and improving the accuracy of estimates of cost
of compliance.
Municipalities, like the City of Lewiston, recognize the need for environ-
mental regulation. However, the Federal Government must recognize that
municipalities are not a bottomless pit of cash. The attitude of some Federal
Officials that the cost of implementing a requirement is not a consideration
is extremely offensive to local officials, who deal with cost issues every hour
of every day. It is time to rollback unfair or unrealistic regulations and to
start to look at the real impact of the regulation instead of the 'supposed'
impact. The economic impact of a regulation on local communities must be
weighed with the environmental impact. Problems will continue until local
elected officials and citizens can see the benefit of meeting a regulation from
both an economic and environmental aspect. For example, how do you con-
vince someone with rusty tapwater that the City of Lewiston needs to spend
millions of dollars on its water supply, which is excellent, but cannot afford
to replace the old water pipe installed in 1878 in front of his/her house be-
cause of the expenditure on the water source? Until questions like this can
be answered to the satisfaction of our citizens, we will not be doing our job.
MAINE REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 (Introductory letter Robert Mulready).
The difficulty, of course, lies in the additional complexity this approach creates.
How does one create a system that prioritizes among "environmental risks," (defined
narrowly to include only those risks that the EPA regulates)? No consensus has
emerged on this relatively limited issue. Achieving a consensus on the far more broad
issue described by the Anchorage Report would be much more difficult.
Furthermore, lumping pollution control issues with other local concerns greatly
increases the likelihood that the former will receive a much lower priority than they
do currently. As Marcus, supra note 87, notes, a key reason for the EPA's creation as
an independent pollution control agency was the concern that environmental control
programs would suffer if merged with other issues under the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services). Id. at
8-20.
91. The EPA's Local Government/Small Community Dialogue Group identified
the need to include local governments in the rule and policy development process as
well. See supra note 53.
92. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 581 (1993); see Alana S. Knaster &
Philip J. Harter, The Clean Fuels Regulatory Negotiation, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PER-
SPECViVE 20 (1992)
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Further, the federal government needs to do a better job, not
only of determining what role costs should play in setting environ-
mental standards, but also of estimating costs associated with spe-
cific mandates, and associated with mandates collectively.
Congress has already made an initial effort in this area, passing the
State and Local Cost Estimate Act of 1981.93 This statute requires
the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") to prepare "fiscal
notes" that estimate the costs that "significant" bills (i.e., bills that
will cost $200 million or more) will impose.94 The supporters of
this process "believed that one cause of excessive regulatory costs
was inadequate information." 95 Congress directed the CBO to pre-
pare these "fiscal notes" to avoid "costly, unintended conse-
quences" of its legislative efforts.96 ACIR identified a number of
flaws with this process in its report.97 In his comments during the
March 5, 1993, meeting of the ICMA Environmental Mandates
Task Force, James Blum of the Congressional Budget Office stated
that the CBO has been preparing analyses of the cost impacts of
federal legislation for 10 years. But, he said that "the analysis
seems to be an afterthought, and only in a few instances did it have
any impact whatsoever." 98
In sum, it appears clear that the current process Congress has
established to help it balance costs and benefits as it considers leg-
islation is flawed and needs refinement.
Third, the federal government should consider expanding the
scope of the Facilities Compliance Act to all local governments.
This is one of the few bills that Congress has passed that provides
for a multi-media analysis of environmental issues as applied to a
particular segment of the regulated community. In particular, it
addresses the impact of environmental regulations on very small
towns (defined to be towns with fewer than 2,500 residents).99 As
93. 2 U.S.C. § 653 (1988).
94. Id.
95. ACIR REPORT, supra note 3, at 61.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 62-68.
98. MEETING NoTES, supra note 5, at 3.
99. H.R. 1056, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). Numerous other bills have been
introduced in Congress in recent years to address the issue of federal mandates. Four
types of bills are discussed briefly below.
First, a number of bills have been introduced that would, if enacted, purport to
"end the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on States and local govern-
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ments and to ensure that the Federal Government pays the costs incurred by those
governments in complying with certain requirements under Federal statutes and regu-
lations." See, e.g., the Community Regulatory Relief Act (May 1993, S. Kempthorne);
the Federal Mandates Relief Act of 1993, (March 1993, S. Gregg) ("[P]rohibit[ing]
States and local governments from being obligated to take any action required by any
new Federal law, unless: (1) all expenses associated with such obligation are fully
funded by the Federal government; and (2) each Federal agency that has authority to
administer a Federal mandate publishes a schedule of compliance costs.").
A second type of bill is exemplified by the Fiscal Accountability and Intergovern-
mental Reform Act ("FAIR Act"), introduced in the 103d Congress by Representa-
tive Moran in March 1993. This bill is intended to "improve Federal decision making
by requiring a thorough evaluation of the economic impact of Federal legislative and
regulatory requirements on State and local governments and the economic resources
located therein." H.R. 1295, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
In an August 22, 1993, editorial entitled Mandates Impose Unfair Burden, the
Atlanta Constitution endorsed this bill as follows:
What has mayors and county executives around the nation tearing at
their hair are the increasing funding loads that they are being asked to bear.
In Georgia, for instance, local governments spent 20 percent of their budgets
in 1990 on federally mandates projects; just three years later, they are spend-
ing 25 to 30 percent. Municipalities with tight budgets are being confronted
far too quickly with the unhappy choice of cutting services or raising taxes
and fees.
This conundrum is not to be solved by trying to squeeze more funds out
of a federal government that routinely runs up $300 billion deficits of, con-
versely, by suspending the vital mandate function. Congress and federal reg-
ulators, however, ought to have to contemplate the potential impact of new
standards before they put them in action.
That is the intent of a bipartisan bill sponsored by Reps. James... and
co-sponsored by 140 others .... Under its provisions, the Congressional
Budget Office would raise a flag on any federal mandate that would cost in
excess of $50 million over three years and the feds would have to choose the
lowest cost of the workable options for carrying out the mandate.
Of all the ideas being floated for lightening the mandate burden, this
seems the most sensible, best-informed approach.
Mandates Impose Unfair Burden, THE ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Aug. 22, 1993, at D4.
Senator Moynihan's proposed Senate Bill No. 110 takes yet another tact but also
is intended to address one of the major issues that local governments have raised. See
S. 110, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). This bill, entitled the Environmental Risk Reduc-
tion Act, is intended to "help advance the practice of environmental risk assessment
and cost-benefit analysis." Id. Senator Moynihan introduced a bill to accomplish the
same objective in November, 1991, as well. See S. 2132, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works held a hearing on this bill
on September 18, 1992. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works, 102d Cong. (U.S. GPO ISBN 0-16-039866-5).
A fourth legislative proposal, which Senator Lautenberg introduced, entitled the
Toxic Cleanup Equity Act of 1993, would require that environmental mandates be
viewed in the context of all of a municipality's obligations. S. 965, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993). This concept that environmental obligations should not be viewed in-
dependent of other responsibilities also is embodied in a February, 1992, decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Compet-
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part of the Facilities Compliance Act,10° Congress enacted a "small
town environmental planning" requirement that requires the EPA
to take several actions to address the concerns that small towns
have raised concerning environmental regulation, including, inter
alia, the following:
EPA must establish a "Small Town Environmental Planning
Task Force," which shall, inter alia, (1) identify federal environ-
mental regulations that pose significant compliance problems
for small towns; and (2) review proposed environmental regula-
tions and suggest revisions to improve the ability of small towns
to comply with them;101
itive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321 (D.C.Cir. 1992) (holding that the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is obligated to analyze whether con-
tinuation of higher fuel standards for cars (and resulting energy savings), is worth-
while in light of the reduced safety inherent in the resulting manufacture of smaller
cars). In Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Court invalidated the 1990 Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standard ("CAFE") on the ground that the U.S. Department
of Transportation's imposition of more stringent fuel use requirements failed ade-
quately to account for CAFE's adverse effects on safety. Id. at 322. The Court noted
that a primary means of achieving improved fuel economy is downsizing and lighten-
ing of cars, which results in less crashworthy vehicles, a cost that has not generally
entered into decisions about fuel economy standards. Id. at 324-25.
100. See supra note 56.
101. The Clinton Administration recently established the membership of this
Task Force (the Task Force will be a subcommittee of the Environmental Require-
ments for Local Government Policy Dialogue Advisory Committee that was
chartered in November 1992). September 10, 1993, telephone call with Denise A.
Zabinski, Acting Leader of the Local Government Team, Office of Regional Opera-
tions and State/Local Relations [hereinafter Zabinski]. See POLICY DIALOGUE, supra
note 45.
This Advisory Committee was formally chartered as a Federal Advisory Commit-
tee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) in 1992. 5 U.S.C § 1-15
(1992) The predecessor to this Advisory Committee was the EPA's "Local Govern-
ment/Small Community Dialogue Group." See Memorandum from Judith Kertcher,
Acting Associate Administrator, EPA Office of Regional Operations and Statistical Re-
lations, to Dialogue Group Participants and Observers (Feb. 9, 1993). According to
then Acting Associate Administrator Kertcher's February 9, 1993, memorandum, the
Dialogue Group met a total of four times, with the first meeting held in September
1992. From September 1992 to December 1992, the Dialogue Group "worked to de-
velop problem statements and action items in three areas-financing environmental
requirements, regulatory cost and benefit data and information needs, and regulatory
flexibility (including risk-based prioritization and local government participation in
regulatory development)." Id. at 2.
The Dialogue Group identified the following issues as needing attention: (1) "es-
tablish[ing] a process and structure that will authorize priority setting.., that will
produce better environmental results and more efficient expenditures based on area
specific problems.... This will allow finite, limited financial resources to be devoted
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EPA must publish a list of environmental requirements that
apply to small towns.10 2 EPA has completed a draft Guidebook,
as of September 1993, that it hopes to send to be printed within
the near future;10 3 and
EPA must implement a program to notify small towns of
these requirements (and proposed future requirements).1°4 Ac-
cording to EPA officials, this program is under development. 0 5
Reviewing the results of these actions and, if the results are
positive, consiering how best to expand their application to all local
governments, will help to strengthen the federal-local
partnership.' o6
CONCLUSION
In recent years local governments have increasingly com-
plained about what they believe is an unfortunate confluence of
trends in the area of environmental regulation (a decrease in fed-
eral funding and an increase in federal-imposed obligations or
to the highest and most effective environmental use based on local conditions"; (2)
including local governments in the rule and policy development process; (3) creating
"one-stop" shopping for local governments to streamline the permitting process; (4)
increasing federal investment in environmental infrastructure; and (5) providing fed-
eral technical assistance to assist local governments in complying with environmental
requirements. (Dec. 18, 1992), at 1-3.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
105. Zabinski, supra note 101.
106. In its August 1993 report, the EPA includes an Appendix F, in which it
catalogs EPA activities related to local governments. See EPA REPORT, supra note 5,
at App. F. The Appendix provides a useful summary of EPA activities, despite its
qualification:
This list does not provide a historical perspective nor does it serve as an
all inclusive detailed directory of these types of activities. The compilation
of this catalog does not necessarily imply that these activities are being effec-
tively or frequently used by local governments, are cost effective, or have
helped resolve the concerns of local government.
Id. at 1 (emphasis in original).
Among other activities, the EPA has established at least seven "task forces, com-
mittees and groups" to address local government issues (see Appendix F2-F3); it has
created a number of "data/information systems, networks, and clearinghouses" that it
believes may be of some help to local governments (see Appendix F15-F16); it has
prepared a number of "guides/handbooks" that it similarly believes may be of some
help (see Appendix F12-F14); it has created a large number of technical assistance
programs (see Appendix F4-F10); and it has conducted a number of "internal agency
efforts and studies related to local governments" (see Appendix F17-F19).
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mandates). Other local government concerns with federal environ-
mental regulations identified above have exacerbated this tension
between the different levels of government (e.g., the federal gov-
ernment's purported failure to listen to local governments in creat-
ing the regulatory strategies; local governments' difficulty in
understanding the need for these strategies; and the inefficiencies
stemming from the lack of flexibility in the federal scheme and its
failure systematically to prioritize among environmental concerns
or address them comprehensively, instead relying on media-spe-
cific approaches).
The criticisms that local governments are making regarding
the environmental regulatory structure should not diminish its ac-
complishments over the past twenty plus years.'0 7 Nevertheless,
the challenge that local governments are posing to the existing re-
gime deserves serious attention. Many of these challenges raise
questions concerning fundamental features of our environmental
regulatory regime, including the following:
1) Is it time to develop a coordinated environmental regu-
latory policy in this country;
2) If so, how do we overcome the barriers that exist to our
creating such a policy (e.g., the multitude of Congressional com-
mittees, the multitude of media-specific environmental statutes,
and the EPA's own organizational structure);
3) How inclusive should our environmental regulatory pro-
cess be, and what steps should we take to make it more
inclusive;
4) How should the goals of ensuring a "level playing field"
and having a regulatory structure that is relatively easy to ad-
minister and enforce be balanced with the need for flexibility;
5) What role should costs play in the standard setting pro-
cess, and what information needs do we have in this area;
6) How should environmental needs (however they are de-
fined) be balanced with other societal needs; and
7) How should the responsibilities for identifying environ-
mental problems, setting priorities, and developing, implement-
ing, and paying for strategies to address these problems be
allocated within our federal system of government?
Local governments have provided a service by raising these
107. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)
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issues. Actions like the Moynihan and Lautenberg bills, and the
Facility Compliance Act, described above, suggest that these issues
are beginning to percolate at the national level. The EPA, as the
nation's environmental regulatory agency, should continue in for-
mer Administrator Reilly's footsteps to push these issues. One
step the Agency should take is to continue to make changes at the
administrative level where possible. Identifying and implementing
strategies to "remake" the Agency's own operations undoubtedly
will prove to be neither simple nor painless enterprises. The sec-
ond "next step" that the Agency needs to take will be at least
equally challenging-identifying and confronting impediments in
its governing statutes and in the nature of Congressional oversight
to addressing these issues effectively.

